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ELECTIONS-NOMINATIONS AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS:
THE SUPREME COURT FINDS THAT CALIFORNIA'S
"BLANKET PRIMARY" VIOLATES POLITICAL PARTIES'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)
I. FACTS
California has two different ways a candidate can get on the general
ballot for most state and federal elective offices.' He or she can win the
primary of a qualified political party and thereby receive its nomination.2
Alternatively, he or she can file as an independent by obtaining a certain
percentage of the signatures of the state's electorate or the voting
population of the area represented by the office in contest, depending on
whether or not the election is for statewide office.3
Prior to 1996, California utilized a so-called "closed" primary system.4
Under this system, only members of a political party could vote for that
party's candidate. 5 Through the adoption of Proposition 198 in 1996, this
system was changed to a so-called "blanket" primary.6 Under this blanket
primary system, "[a]ll persons entitled to vote, including those not affiliated
with any political party, shall have the right to vote ... for any candidate
regardless of the candidate's political affiliation." 7 The ballot each voter
receives now lists every candidate, regardless of the voter's party affiliation,
and the voter has the option of voting for any of them.8 Under the closed
primary system previously utilized by California, the ballot each voter
1. CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 8400 & 15451 (West 1996).
2. Id. § 15451. A party is qualified if one of the following three conditions are met: (1) in the
last gubernatorial election, one of its statewide candidates polled at least two percent of the
statewide vote; (2) the party's membership is at least one percent of the statewide vote at the last
preceding gubernatorial election; or (3) voters numbering at least 10 percent of the statewide vote
at the last gubernatorial election sign a petition stating that they intend to form a new party. Id. §
5100 (West 1996 and Supp. 2000).
3. Id. § 8400.
4. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 568 (2000).
5. Id. at 569 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 2150, 2151 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001)). At the
time of this decision, four states used a blanket primary system, either partisan or nonpartisan,
including California. See discussion infra Part l1.B. 1.
6. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 568-71. Proposition 198 was adopted by initiative; the
results being 59.51% (3,340,642 votes) in favor and 40.49% (2,273,064 votes) opposed.
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1999).
7. CAL. ELEc. CODE § 2001 (repealed 2000).
8. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 570.
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received only had candidates listed from the party with which that particular
voter was affiliated.9 The result under the new system is the same as under
the old: the candidate of each party who gets the greatest number of votes
becomes that party's candidate. 10
As a result of the adoption of Proposition 198, four political parties
(Parties)" brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of California.12 These Parties all had a rule stating that only
members of the party could vote in the party's primary while non-members
were prohibited from doing so.13 The Parties primarily alleged that the
blanket primary adopted by the voters of California violated their First
Amendment right of association. 14
In its decision, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of California upheld the blanket primary.15 According to the court, the
inquiry does not end once the court establishes that the interest in
determining who will vote in a party's primary is protected by the First
Amendment.16 If this were the case, an open primary would also be
invalidated as unconstitutional if a party objected to it since an open
primary allows voters who are not registered members of a party to vote in
that party's primary, just as in a blanket primary.17 The court was also
concerned that if the Parties had their way, this would unduly restrict the
power of the states to require that political parties use primary elections to
select their candidates for general elections.' 8 Furthermore, the state's
authority to establish voter registration requirements as to who can vote in
primaries would be infringed upon by the party member qualification
rules.19 According to the court, political parties are like the government
9. Id.
10. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15451 (West 1996). However, the blanket primary instituted
through Proposition 198 did not apply directly to the apportionment of presidential delegates.
Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 570 (citing CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 15151, 15375, 15500 (West
1996 & Supp. 2001)).
11. These parties were the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the
Libertarian Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party. Cal. Democratic Party, 530
U.S. at 571.
12. Id. Californians for an Open Primary also intervened as a party defendant. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Parties sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Id.
15. California Democratic Party v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (E.D. Cal. 1997).
16. Id. at 1295.
17. Id. If political parties had an "unfettered" power to determine who could be a party
member and how to select their candidates, states could infringe on this power through the
requirement that the parties select their candidates through primary elections. Id.
18. Id. Just as a state requiring candidate selection through primary elections would infringe
on the power of political parties, so would a state's requirement that any registered voter be
allowed to vote in a party's primary. Id.
19. Id. at 1295-96.
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itself, performing governmental functions, and should therefore be subject
to state election regulations. 20
The district court did recognize that the regulation would have the
effect of a "substantial amount of cross-over voting" in a party's primary;
this could result in a candidate being selected who is different from the one
candidate party members would select or, at least, may cause the same
candidate to commit himself to different positions.21 However, the district
court upheld the blanket primary established through Proposition 198,
finding that the burden imposed on the Parties through the blanket primary
was not severe and that it was outweighed by the compelling interests of
California, primarily "[i]ncreasing the representativeness of elected
officials, giving voters greater choice, and increasing voter turnout and
participation in the primary process." 22
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision,
adopting the district court's opinion as its own.23 The Parties appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States which held that the burden
Proposition 198 placed on the Parties' right of political association was both
severe and unnecessary, and it therefore violated a political party's First
Amendment right of association.2 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The freedom of association is a fundamental right protected by the First
Amendment, even though it is not one of the freedoms expressly
enumerated within the language of the First Amendment. 25 Since the
freedom of association was expressed in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson,2 6 the Supreme Court has considered at least three different sides
of this right.27 One is the right to associate to achieve economic or other
20. Id. at 1296.
21. Id. at 1298-99. Voters, who have a party preference or affiliation, can vote in another
party's primary in order to influence the choice of candidate for that party. Id. at 1299. In
addition, since not only party members can vote in the party's primary, the candidates will have to
appeal to voters from the entire electorate and might, as a result, take different positions on
political issues. Id.
22. Id. at 1303 (citing Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 1992)).
23. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1999).
24. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000).
25. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 943 (1995).
For an overview of the history of primary elections, see Gary D. Allison, Protecting Party Purity
in the Selection of Nominees for Public Office: The Supremes Strike Down California's Blanket
Primaries and Endanger the Open Primaries of Many States, 36 TULSA L.J. 59 (2000).
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
27. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1199-1200 (6th ed.
2000).
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goals that are not related to any other right guaranteed by the Constitution.28
Second is that freedom of association which "is protected by the concept of
liberty in the due process clauses." 29 This aspect of the freedom of
association is an implicit part of the Bill of Rights guarantees. 30 Third is the
right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those types of activity that
are expressly protected by the First Amendment.3'
A. ESTABLISHING THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ELECTION LAW
CASES
The Supreme Court has developed a test to be used when determining
whether an election law infringes upon a political party's First Amendment
right of freedom of association. 32 When determining the constitutionality of
a state election law, a court has to weigh the "character and magnitude" of
the burden imposed on the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments with the interests set forth as justifications by the state. 33 A
court has to consider the extent to which the state's interests made the
burden necessary. 34 The level of review depends on the weight of the
burden: if the burden is severe, the regulation must be narrowly tailored and
advance a compelling state interest, but if it is a lesser burden, "important
regulatory interests" will generally be enough "to justify reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions."35
The Court recognized early that voters cannot be excluded from the
election process in a way that violates a right set forth in the Constitution.36
Even though party affairs are not public affairs, if political parties are given
a special role in an election process and the parties have a discriminatory
process, this discriminatory action by the parties becomes state action under
the Fifteenth Amendment. 37
28. Id. at 1200.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The freedom of association discussed in this article is of this last type.
32. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities New Area Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997)
(summarizing the test to be used when election laws are challenged as unconstitutional).
33. Id. at 358 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
34. Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
35. Id. at 358-59 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.
780, 788 (1983) and Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992))).
36. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989)
(emphasizing that a state cannot infringe on its citizen's First Amendment rights when regulating
elections); see also Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450
U.S. 107, 121 (1981) (reiterating that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the First Amendment
freedom of association from infringement by a state).
37. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring) (concluding that, in
action against political organization for excluding blacks from its primary, an organization "takes
[VOL. 77:827
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Included in the right of political association is the freedom of political
parties and their members to associate with others for the common
advancement of political beliefs and ideas. 38 This freedom contains a
freedom not to associate with those who do not share the same views.39
In Anderson v. Celebrezze,40 the Court set forth a test to use when
determining constitutional challenges to election laws.41 In this case, an
Ohio statute imposed an early deadline for independent candidates for
President to file a statement of candidacy; however, this deadline was not
required for candidates of existing political parties.4 2 The Court found that
the state only had a minimal interest in imposing the earlier deadline.4 3
According to the Court, the statute particularly placed a burden on the
associational rights of independent voters and candidates. 44 This significant
restriction on an electoral process -with nationwide implications clearly
outweighed the minimal interest of the state, and the Court accordingly
found the Ohio statute in question to be unconstitutional.4 5
on those attributes of government which draw the Constitution's safeguards into play" when the
organization's nominees generally won in the primaries and the ensuing general election); see also
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (noting that a state cannot circumvent constitutional
rights by letting a private organization conduct primary elections). When a state, through the
establishment of an election process, "endorses, adopts and enforces" certain practices of a
political party, that action by the political party is in effect the action of the state. Allwright, 321
U.S. at 664. Only if something is considered a state action do the constitutional safeguards come
into play. Terry, 345 U.S. at 484 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing Allwright, 321 U.S. at 664).
38. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975) ("There can no longer be any doubt
that freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is
a form of 'orderly group activity' protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments" (quoting
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973) (reviewing First and Fourteenth Amendment case
law))).
39. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
40. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
41. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90; see also Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 183 (1979) (setting forth the different factors to consider for determining whether
there has been a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); American Party of Texas v. White, 415
U.S. 767, 780-81 (1974) (emphasizing that while the validity of the challenged ballot qualification
systems depended on whether the qualifications were necessary to further compelling state
interests, these limitations were "reasonably taken in pursuit of vital state objectives that cannot be
served equally well in significantly less burdensome ways" and therefore constitutionally valid);
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (noting that there is no "litmus-paper test" and
decisions are instead a "matter of degree"); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972)
(emphasizing that there are different standards of review depending on the impact on the rights of
the voters); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (failing to show the required
compelling state interests when the state favored established parties over new ones, burdening
both the right to vote and the right to associate).
42. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780. An independent candidate was required to file in March in
order to appear on the general election ballot in November. Id.
43. Id. at 806.
44. Id. at 795.
45. Id. at 806.
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As to the test used, the Court emphasized that when a state's election
laws are challenged, there is no "litmus-paper test" that can be used to
determine whether a provision is constitutional or not.46 A court must
instead weigh the injury to the rights of the plaintiff, protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, with the interests asserted by the state as a
justification for the burden that is placed on the plaintiff.47 There is no
black-letter rule that can be automatically applied.4 8 Instead, "[i]n passing
judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights."49
The Court thereafter applied the Anderson test to invalidate a state's
closed primary statute. 50 In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,5 1
the original plaintiffs, a political party and some of its officers, challenged a
statute which required that a person, to be able to vote in a party's primary,
be a registered member of that party.52 This statute had previously been
challenged and upheld as constitutional. 53 Now however, the Supreme
Court, applying the test set forth in Anderson, found that the Connecticut
statute in question limited "the Party's associational opportunities at the
crucial juncture at which the appeal to common principles may be translated
into concerted action, and hence to political power in the community." 54
Connecticut asserted four interests as compelling: "ensuring the
administrability of the primary system, preventing raiding, avoiding voter
confusion, and protecting the responsibility of party government." 55
46. Id. at 789 (citing Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
47. Id. at 789.
48. Id. at 789-90.
49. Id. at 789.
50. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986).
51. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
52. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 210.
53. Id. at 212 (citing Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily affd,
429 U.S. 989 (1976)).
54. Id. at 216.
[C]onstitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws cannot be
resolved by any 'litmus-paper test' that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.
Instead, a court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury
to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks
to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it
also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff's rights.
Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 217.
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However, the Court concluded that these interests were "insubstantial." 56
Consequently, the Connecticut statute failed the Anderson test and was
declared unconstitutional. 57
Thereafter, in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee,58 the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to California's
election laws, for the second time.59 The Court appeared to state that strict
scrutiny was to be used regardless of the severity of the burden imposed on
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as long as there
was a burden. 60 After determining that there was indeed a burden, the
Court noted that the statute would be constitutionally valid only "if the
56. Id. at 225. Connecticut's argument that the administration of the system preferred by the
plaintiff would cost the state too much was rejected because according to the Court, a state "can
no more restrain the Republican Party's freedom of association for reasons of its own
administrative convenience than it could on the same ground limit the ballot access of a new
major party." Id. at 218. As for the interest of preventing raiding, the Court noted that while it
had previously recognized that a state does have a legitimate interest in preventing party raiding,
that interest was not implicated here. Id. at 219. Under the challenged state statute, independents
could merely register as Republicans to be eligible to vote in the Republican primary, with the
statute then actually assisting in raiding by independents. Id. In addition, raiding typically does
not refer to acts by independent voters but to registered voters of another party. Id. Reviewing
the argument that a closed primary system avoids voter confusion, the Court emphasized that its
previous cases reflected "a greater faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves
about campaign issues" than that accorded them by Connecticut. Id. at 220 (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797 (1983)). Furthermore, the plaintiff's rule would give plaintiff and
its members a "substantial benefit" when it chose its candidate. Id. at 221. Lastly, the Court
responded to the fourth compelling interest asserted by Connecticut, protecting the responsibility
of party government; the Court noted that it was not its role to determine whether the Connecticut
legislature made the right decision in adopting the closed primary system, since the plaintiff's
right to decide itself how to pursue its political goals is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at
222-24.
57. Id. at 225.
After Tashjian it is clear that political parties have a constitutional right to permit
unaffiliated voters to participate in their primaries, even in states with election statutes
restricting voting in primaries to registered party members. Insofar as closed primary
statutes bar participation of unaffiliated voters in party primaries despite party rules
permitting the participation of such voters, these statutes are unconstitutional.
Pursuant to party rules, then, a state must permit independent/unaffiliated voters as
well as party members to vote in the party primary, even if state law establishes a
closed primary.
Brian M. Castro, Smothering Freedom of Association: The Alaska Supreme Court Errs in
Upholding the State's Blanket Primary Statute, 14 ALASKA L. REV. 523, 534 (1997).
58. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
59. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219-22. The Supreme Court had previously heard the case and remanded
it to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for "further consideration in light of Tashjian."
See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 479 U.S. 1024, 1024-25 (1987). The
court of appeals on remand again affirmed the decision of the district court that had struck down
all the challenged regulations as unconstitutional. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm.
v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1987). On appeal, the Supreme Court once more heard the
case. Eu, 489 U.S. at 216.
60. See Eu, 489 U.S. at 222 (setting forth the test to be used). To use strict scrutiny, which
requires a compelling state interest, regardless of the severity of the burden imposed, would not be
in accord with the Court's previous First Amendment cases. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789-90.
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State shows that it advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest." 6'
For one of the statutes at issue, wherein primary endorsements by the
political official governing bodies of political parties were banned,
California set forth as one of its compelling interests the preservation of
party unity during a primary.62 According to the Court, however, this was
not a compelling state interest.63 California's second justification for the
challenged ban on party endorsements and statements of opposition was
"that it [was] necessary to protect primary voters from confusion and undue
influence." 64 Noting that California does have "a legitimate interest in
fostering an informed electorate," the Court found that California had
produced no evidence of the ban on party endorsements fulfilling that
purpose. 65
The Court next turned to the challenges to the restrictions California
had imposed on how official governing bodies can be organized and
composed, the term limits of the office for state central committee chair,
and the requirement that this chair rotate between residents of different
parts of the state.66 Here again, California could not show that the regu-
lations were necessary in the sense of making sure that elections are
"orderly and fair." 67 Thus, those laws were also struck down.68
Following Eu, the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down Illinois
election laws. 69 The Court found that requirements of collecting a certain
61. Eu, 489 U.S. at 222 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id. at 228. Another compelling interest offered by California was to maintain a stable
government. Id. at 226. While the Court found this to be a compelling state interest, California
had not explained how this interest would be promoted by its election laws. Id. Instead, the
explanation offered by California was that this interest also included a similar interest in party
stability. Id. at 227. The Court pointed out that it had previously recognized that a state may not
enact "laws 'to prevent the parties from taking internal steps affecting their own process for the
selection of candidates."' Id. (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 224
(1986)).
64. Id. at 228.
65. Id. at 228-29.
66. Id. at 229.
67. Id. at 233.
68. Id.
69. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1992). Under Illinois statutes, organizers of a
new political party must (1) canvass the electoral area where they wished to run candidates; (2)
when running candidates for statewide office, obtain the signatures of 1 percent of the voters at the
last statewide election or 25,000 voters, whichever is less; and (3) when running candidates solely
for offices within a political subdivision of the state, circulate petitions containing a complete list
of candidates for all offices to be filled in the subdivision at large, and obtain signatures (a) from
five percent of the voters at the last election in the subdivision or 25,000 voters, whichever is less,
or (b) if the subdivision is divided into separate districts from which some officers are elected,
[VOL. 77:827
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amount of signatures in order to establish a new political party were broader
than necessary to advance electoral order and therefore violated the right of
political association under the First Amendment.70
In Burdick v. Takushi,71 Hawaii's ban on write-in voting was
challenged as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 72 There, the
prohibition was upheld. 73 The Court started by stating that not every
burden on the right to vote is entitled to strict scrutiny, making clear that
this was supported by previous case law. 74 It then went on to note that there
will always be burdens imposed on the voters through election laws but to
mandate that all election laws pass strict scrutiny "would tie the hands of
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently." 75
Emphasizing more than once that the test set out in Anderson is to be
used,76 the Court found that the burdens imposed on voters by Hawaii's ban
on write-in voting were constitutional. 77 Since the burdens were limited,
Hawaii did not need compelling interests to uphold the law. 78 Hawaii's two
asserted interests, "avoiding the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at
the general election" and guarding against party raiding, were found to be
legitimate interests, and the ban imposed on write-in voting was found to be
a "reasonable way of accomplishing this goal." 79
Finally, in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,80 the Court applied
strict scrutiny to uphold a Minnesota statute prohibiting a candidate from
appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party, or
from five percent of the voters at the last election in each district or 25,000 voters, whichever is
less. Id. at 282-83.
70. Id. at 290 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793-94 (1983) and Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1968)).
71. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
72. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 430.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 433. The Court accordingly seemed to reject the contention from Tashjian that all
burdens are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. The Court referred, among other things, to its decisions
in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) and Tashjian in which it stated
the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes through
the ballot are [not] absolute. The Constitution provides that States may prescribe "the
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives" and




76. Id. at 434, 438.
77. Id. at 441-42.
78. Id. at 439.
79. Id. at 439-40.
80. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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"fusion."81 Again, the Supreme Court set forth the test to be applied. 82 It
first noted that when determining the constitutionality of a state election
law, the Court has to weigh the "character and magnitude" of the burden
imposed on the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
with the interests set forth as justifications by the state.8 3 The Court
considered the extent to which the state's interests made the burden
necessary. 84 The level of review depends on the heaviness of the burden: if
the burden is severe, the regulation must be narrowly tailored and advance a
compelling state interest; if it is a lesser burden, an "important regulatory
interest" will generally be enough to justify "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions." 85 There is no "bright line" by which valid election laws can
be distinguished from those that violate the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment.86
The Court went on to emphasize "that a party is [not] absolutely en-
titled to have its nominee appear on the ballot as that party's candidate" and
that a party's association rights are not severely burdened by a particular
individual possibly not appearing on the ballot as that party's candidate. 87
As opposed to the regulations challenged in Tashjian and Eu, Minnesota's
prohibition on fusion did not involve "regulation of political parties'
internal affairs and core associational activities." 88 Just because fusion
might make it easier for third parties to succeed does not require Minnesota
or any other state to permit it.89 Concluding that the burdens imposed by
the fusion ban were not severe, the Court found that those burdens were
81. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 353-54. Fusion, also called "cross-filing" or "multiple-party nomi-
nation," is when more than one party supports the same candidate. Id. at 353-54 & n.1 (quoting
Agersinger, "A Place on the Ballot": Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AMER. HIST. REV.
287, 288 (1980)).
82. Id. at 358-59.
83. Id. at 358 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
84. Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
85. Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; see also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89
(1992)). The Court stated:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth Amendment
associational rights, we weigh the "character and magnitude" of the burden the State's
rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden,
and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary.
Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored
and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exact-
ing review, and a State's "important regulatory interests" will usually be enough to
justify "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."
Id. at 358 (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 359 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
87. Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 440 & n.10).
88. Id. at 360.
89. Id. at 361-62.
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justified by "correspondingly weighty" valid state interests in ballot
integrity and political stability. 90
When the Court has been confronted with state laws that conflict with
party rules, the Court has upheld the validity of the party rules. 91 In both
Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette,92 and
Cousins v. Wigoda,93 the Court found that the state could not force a party
to seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates that party's rules.94
B. USE OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS IN OTHER STATES
While the systems for primary elections vary from state to state, they
fall into four general categories. 95 These are the closed primary, the semi-
closed primary, the open primary, and the blanket primary.96
1. The Different Types of Primaries
First, there is the traditional closed primary where participation in a
party's primary election is only for voters who are registered voters of that
party. 97 Twelve states have such closed primaries. 98
Twenty-one states use the so-called semi-closed primary. 99 Here, only
registered party members and independents can vote in a party's primary. 00
90. Id. at 363, 369-70.
91. See Democratic Party v. Wis. ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981); Cousins v.
Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,483 (1975).
92. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
93. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
94. See LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 126 (holding that when the Democratic Party of the United
States had rules under which delegates to its national convention were to be chosen through
procedures in which only Democrats participated, Wisconsin could not force the convention to
seat delegates from Wisconsin when Wisconsin allowed members of other parties and
independents to vote in the Democratic primary); Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483 (reversing decision of
appellate court which held that Illinois state law governed how parties selected their delegates, not
the parties' internal rules).
95. Elisabeth R. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary Election Systems and Representa-
tion, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304, 306 (1998).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3161 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.021 (West 1982 &
Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301, 25-3304 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.055
(Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 3-101 to 8-711 (1997); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 32-912 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293.287 (Michie 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-
5-12 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 1-104, 5-302 (McKinney 1998); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2832 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-35 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-
5-212 (Michie 2001).
99. ALA. CODE § 17-16-14 (1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-7-201 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9-23a, 9-431 (West 1989 & Supp. 2001); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-43 (West 1993
& Supp. 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-10-1-24 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
43.38, 43.41, 43.42 (West 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 53, §§ 37, 37A, 38 (West 1991 &
Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 11!, 340 (West 1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-
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The difference as compared to the closed primary is that independents can
vote in a semi-closed primary but are not allowed to do so in a closed
primary system.l0 l Registered voters of other parties cannot vote in that
party's primary. 102
An open primary is one in which a registered voter can, on the day of
the primary election, request the ballot of any party, regardless of whether
or not the voter is a registered member of that party.' 03 However, the voter
cannot vote for candidates from more than one party.104 Thirteen states
have open primaries, among them North Dakota. 1o5
Finally, at the time of the decision in California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 06 two states other than California had blanket primaries. 107 Here, a
registered voter can vote for the candidates of any party; the voter is not
limited to voting for candidates of just one party, and all voters receive the
same ballot.108 Louisiana uses a nonpartisan blanket primary which is
different from the blanket primary in the other three states in that the
candidates with the most votes, regardless of party affiliation, go on to the
general election. 109
15-575 (2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.397 (West 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 654:34 (1996);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:23-45 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-39 (2000); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3513.18, 3513.19 (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 26, § 1-104 (West 1997);
OR. REV. STAT. § 254.365 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-9.1-23, 17-9.1-24 (2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 7-9-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-6-26 (Michie 1995
& Supp. 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-115 (1994 & Supp. 2001); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §
162.003 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 2002). Included are states with statutes that explicitly allow the
political parties themselves to determine whether independent voters are to be able to vote in their
primaries. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-115.





105. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-7-
308 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 12-31 (1993); IDAHO
CODE § 34-904 (Michie 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.575, 168.576 (West 1989 &
Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.08 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-
10-301 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-22 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3-104.5 (Supp.
2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-530 (Michie 2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 17, § 2363 (1982); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 5.37 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001).
106. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
107. ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.060 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.200 (West
1993).
108. Gerber & Morton, supra note 95, at 306.
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:521 (West 1979 & Supp. 2001).
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2. State Court Decisions Upholding Blanket Primary Statutes
Some state courts have upheld blanket primary statutes.110 In Heavey
v. Chapman,"'1 the Supreme Court of Washington found that the state's
blanket primary statute was constitutional because it did not infringe on the
right of association guaranteed under both the state and federal
constitutions., 2 The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in
Storer v. Brown"13 for the proposition that the plaintiffs, the Washington
State Democratic Central Committee and individuals, had the burden of
proof to show that the statute imposed a substantial burden on the right to
associate for political purposes. 114 Only if the plaintiffs had fulfilled this
burden would the state have had the burden of showing a compelling state
interest.115 The court referred to the standard it used as the substantial
burden test.' 16
The court noted that as compared to the statutes challenged in Rosario
v. Rockefellerll 7 and Nader v. Schaffer, 118 the statute challenged in Heavey
was one that encouraged and facilitated participation in the electoral
process.'t 9 The plaintiffs also conceded that there was no substantial
burden imposed on them and that the state did indeed have compelling
interests.120 The compelling interests identified by the court were secrecy,
greater voter participation, and maximizing voter choice.' 2' The court
noted that even if the blanket primary might be defective any action to be
taken would have to be through the legislature or by popular initiative, not
by the court.1 22
110. O'Callaghan v. State, 914 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Alaska 1996); Heavey v. Chapman, 611
P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wash. 1980).
111. 611 P.2d 1256 (Wash. 1980).
112. Heavey, 611 P.2d at 1257. The statute in question, WASH. REV. CODE § 29.18.200,
now sets forth that "[e]xcept as provided otherwise in chapter 29.19 RCW, all properly registered
voters may vote for their choice at any primary held under this title, for any candidate for each
office, regardless of political affiliation and without a declaration of political faith or adherence on
the part of the voter."
113. 415 U.S. 724(1974).
114. Heavey, 611 P.2d at 1257 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729 (1974)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1257-58. This standard varies somewhat from that used by the Supreme Court in
Cal. Democratic Party, which demands that when there is a severe restriction on the freedom of
association, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling
importance. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000).
117. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
118. 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily arid, 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
119. Heavey, 611 P.2d at 1258-59.
120. Id. at 1258.
121. Id. at 1259.
122. Id.
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Likewise, in O'Callaghan v. State (O'Callaghan J),123 the Supreme
Court of Alaska upheld Alaska's blanket primary in 1996, holding that a
blanket primary system is not per se unconstitutional merely because it
conflicts with a party rule regarding selection of political party
candidates. 24 The court expressly referred to the approach set forth by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Burdick as that to be used when
determining the constitutionality of election laws. 25 This led the court to
use the same test as that used by the Supreme Court.126 The court also
pointed to Heavey as being the case most on point from a factual
standpoint. 27 The plaintiffs claimed two harms to their interests: that a
blanket primary system would make it more difficult for the party to protect
itself against raiding than it would be under a partially-closed primary
system, and that the latter system would make the candidates more
accountable to party principles and platform.128 The court recognized that
raiding was a legitimate concern and that it was more likely to occur in a
blanket primary system than in a partially closed primary. 129 Nonetheless,
the court found that these alleged harms were outweighed by the
justifications set forth by the state: encouraging voter turnout, maximizing
voters' freedom of choice among candidates, and ensuring that elected
officials have relatively broad-based constituencies. 130
C. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The determination of whether a statute that infringes on the
associational rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments is
unconstitutional is a two-step process.1 31 First, the Court determines how
123. 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996).
124. O'Callaghan 1, 914 P.2d at 1263. A single blanket primary election was provided for,
allowing a voter to vote for any candidate, regardless of the party affiliation of the voter or the
candidate. Id. at 1252 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.25.010 to 15.25.130 (2000)). However, as a
result of the decision in Cal. Democratic Party, the statute at issue has since been declared
unconstitutional. O'Callaghan v. State (O'Callaghan 11), 6 P.3d 728, 730 (Alaska 2000).
125. O'Callaghan 1, 914 P.2d at 1253 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433-34
(1992)). The section in Burdick the court refers to in turn summarizes the Supreme Court's
previous case law, primarily citing the balancing test set forth in Anderson. See Burdick, 504 U.S.
at 433-34.
126. O'Callaghan 1, 914 P.2d at 1253.
127. Id. at 1256-57.
128. Id. at 1261. The plaintiffs included, among others, the Republican Party of Alaska. Id.
at 1253. The partially closed primary system, which was the rule of the Republican Party of
Alaska, only allowed registered Republicans, registered Independents, and registered voters who
had not stated any party affiliation, to vote in the Republican Party's primary election. Id. at 1252.
129. Id. at 1261.
130. Id. at 1261-63.
131. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997).
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severe the burden is on these rights. 32 Second, depending on how severe
the burden is, the Court applies the appropriate standard of review: if the
burden is severe, the regulation in question must "be narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest." 33 If the burden is not severe, there is
a less exacting review. 134 There is no "bright line [that] separates
permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements
on First Amendment freedoms."135
III. ANALYSIS
In California Democratic Party, the Supreme Court declared
California's blanket primary unconstitutional.136  Justice Scalia, who
authored the opinion for the seven-to-two majority, emphasized that since
political parties are associations protected by the First Amendment freedom
of association, states violate this freedom by forcing the parties to allow
nonparty members to participate in their primary elections.137 Justice
Stevens dissented, believing that primary elections are public affairs which
can be regulated by the states.1 38
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, 139 Justice Scalia found California's
Proposition 198 unconstitutional since the proposition infringed on the
Parties' right of political association.140 The Court held that the burden the
California statute imposed on the Parties' rights was not only severe, but
also unnecessary. 141
The Court started by describing the background of Proposition 198 and
how the primary elections would now work.142 Since California claimed
132. Id. at 358 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
133. Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89
(1992)).
134. Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 and Norman, 502 U.S. at 288-89).
135. Id. at 359 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
136. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584-86 (2000).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Breyer. Id. at 568. Justice Kennedy also filed a concurring opinion. Id.
140. Id. at 586.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 570. The ballot that voters received under Proposition 198 listed all candidates,
no matter what their party affiliation was, and the voters could chose between all of them. Id.
Under the previously used closed primary, each voter would receive a ballot that only listed
candidates from that voter's party. Id. at 571. Nonetheless, it is the candidate from each party
who receives the greatest number of votes who becomes that party's candidate in the general
election. Id. at 570.
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that Proposition 198 was just one of the ways a state can regulate elections,
the Court thereafter described the states' role in the electoral process as it
had developed through its prior decisions. 143
The Court acknowledged that it had previously recognized the major
role the states have "in structuring and monitoring the election process,
including primaries."144 However, this did not mean that political parties'
internal candidate selection processes are something that states can regulate
in whatever way they see fit; candidate selection processes are not
completely public affairs.145 The Court emphasized that states must always
act within the boundaries of the Constitution when they attempt to "regulate
parties' internal processes."146 The Court found it vital in a representative
democracy that citizens can organize with others to promote the candidate
of their choice if they want to. 147 This also encompasses a right not to
associate since it is well established that "a corollary of the right to
associate is the right not to associate." 148
The Court thereafter reviewed what burdens were imposed on the
Parties through Proposition 198.149 According to the Court, one of the most
important functions of a political party is selecting a candidate to represent
it.l50 This is therefore the area in which the political party's right to exclude
is most essential.151 The Court emphasized that its previous cases have
"vigorously affirm[ed] the special place the First Amendment reserves for,
and the special protection it accords, the process by which a political party
143. Id.
144. Id. at 572 (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986)).
145. Id. at 572-73. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, disagreed with this part of the majority's
opinion, reasoning that primary elections are indeed wholly public affairs. Id. at 594-95 & n.4
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 573 (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222 (1989) and Democratic Party of United States v. Wis. ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122
(1981)).
147. Id. at 574. According to the Court, "[r]epresentative democracy in any populous unit of
governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among
the electorate candidates who espouse their political views." Id. There have been political parties
in the United States since the country was first formed. Id. (citing CUNNINGHAM, The
Jeffersonian Republican Party, in 1 HISTORY OF U.S. POLITICAL PARTIES 239, 241 (A.
Schlesinger ed., 1973)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 574-82.
150. Id. at 574. This is an important area because selecting a candidate may impact the





'selects a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and
preferences.' "152
Accordingly, the Court unequivocally stated that the blanket primary
adopted by Proposition 198 violated the principles that the Court
established through its line of election law cases. 153 Not only did Proposi-
tion 198 force political parties to associate with-to have their candidates,
and therefore their positions, determined by-those who had not affiliated
with the party, but it might also have forced a party to associate itself with
those who had expressly affiliated themselves with a rival.154 This made
Proposition 198 "qualitatively" different from a closed primary system. 55
The blanket primary established by Proposition 198 was different from a
closed primary in that in the latter system, even though a voter can easily
change his party affiliation on the day of the election, he or she must at least
formally become a member of that party and is also limited to voting only
for candidates of that party. 56 The Court also noted that the blanket
primary "may be constitutionally distinct from the open primary."157
As for the impact of Proposition 198 on the outcome of the primary
elections, the Court believed that the evidence presented in the case
demonstrated that there was a "clear and present danger," not just a remote
prospect, that a party's candidate may indeed be determined by voters who
share the views of another party.158 This impact would be greatest on
smaller parties. 159
Furthermore, not only would Proposition 198 work to alter the identity
of the candidate selected in a party's primary election, it would also work to
152. Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224
(1989)).
153. Id. at 576.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 576-77.
157. Id. at 577 & n.8. The Court here cited to Justice Powell's dissent in LaFollette, wherein
he described the act of voting in a open primary as an affiliation with the party the individual
chooses to vote for. Id. Voting in a blanket primary might be different however, according to
Justice Powell, since a voter is not limited to candidates of just one party but can vote for
candidates from different parties for each office. Id. Nonetheless, the Cal. Democratic Party
Court emphasized that it did not have to determine the constitutionality of open primaries. Id.
158. Id. at 578. The Court pointed to a survey from 1997 that showed that thirty-seven
percent of California's Republicans said that they planned to vote in the 1998 Democratic primary
for governor and that twenty percent of California's Democrats said that they planned to vote in
the 1998 Republican United States Senate primary. Id. The Court also found support from
surveys conducted in other states that utilize blanket primaries. Id. According to the Court, it
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alter the identity of the party itself.160 When a candidate is selected through
a blanket primary, he or she will have done so by taking somewhat different
positions than those held by the party, as the candidate must appeal to all
voters, not just party members.161 If he or she won in the general election,
the candidate would continue to take these different positions in order to be
renominated. 62
Next, the Court addressed the finding by the court of appeals that since
the Parties were "free to endorse and financially support the candidate of
their choice in the primary," there was only a minor burden imposed upon
them. 163 The Court did not accept this, noting that the fact that the party
leadership could endorse a candidate did not make up for the imposition
that the party was not able to choose its own candidate.164 Furthermore, the
Court did not accept California's claim that since the Parties could engage
in other traditional party behavior, the burden of Proposition 198 was not
severe. 
165
The Court emphasized that it had "consistently refused to overlook an
unconstitutional restriction upon some First Amendment activity simply
because it leaves other First Amendment activity unimpaired."166 The
Court concluded that Proposition 198 forced the political parties in question
"to adulterate their candidate-selection process ... by opening it up to
persons wholly unaffiliated with the party. Such forced association has the
likely outcome-indeed, in this case the intended outcome-of changing
the parties' message."167 Since the Court could think of no heavier burden
on a political party's associational freedom, it found Proposition 198
unconstitutional unless it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
160. Id. at 580. In fact, California's expert concluded that members of Congress who have
been elected through blanket primaries in other states are "more moderate," therefore being "more
reflective of the preferences of the mass of voters at the center of the ideological spectrum." Id.
This was the purpose behind Proposition 198, to produce candidates with more "moderate"
positions that would appeal to a broader range of voters. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 659 (9th Cir. 1999)).
164. Id.
165. Id. Examples of such other traditional party behavior are ensuring "orderly... party
governance, maintaining party discipline in the legislature, and conducting campaigns." Id. at
581. In addition, the Court believed it was "highly questionable" whether the parties could still
successfully engage in this traditional party behavior. Id. However, the Court found that the
effect Proposition 198 might have on these activities was beside the point. Id. at 582.
166. Id. at 581 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) and Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973)).
167. Id. at 581-82.
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interest. 168 Accordingly, the Court applied the strict scrutiny established
through its line of cases. 169
In the third part of the opinion, after describing the background of
Proposition 198 and determining the standard of review, the Court analyzed
the seven interests set forth by California.170 Ultimately, all of the interests
argued by California as compelling were rejected by the Court. 171 The first
two interests, "producing elected officials who better represent the
electorate and expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan
concerns," were dismissed by the Court because California itself admitted
that they were "simply circumlocution for producing nominees and
nominee positions other than those the parties would choose if left to their
own devices."' 72 The Court found that these interests "reduce to nothing
more than a stark repudiation of freedom of political association" since a
majority of the voters will not have the same views as candidates chosen by
the Parties themselves. 73
The third interest California had set forth as compelling was "that the
blanket primary is the only way to ensure that disenfranchised persons
enjoy the right to an effective vote."17 4  California's definition of
"disenfranchised" did not encompass people who could not vote; rather, this
term referred to independents and members of minority parties living in
districts where there was a secure majority for one of the major parties. 175
The Court referred to its previous decisions in which it had stated that a
"nonmember's desire to participate in the party's affairs is overborne by the
168. Id. at 582 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).
169. Id. (setting forth the standard to be used).
170. Id. These interests were (1) producing elected officials who better represented the
electorate, (2) expanding candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concern, (3) ensuring that
disenfranchised persons enjoy a right to an effective vote, (4) promoting fairness, (5) affording
voters greater choice, (6) increasing voter participation, and (7) protecting privacy. Id. at 582-84.
171. Id. at 582-86. The Court noted that the last four interests could be compelling but were
not so in the circumstances of the case. Id. at 584.
172. Id. at 582. According to two commentators, these interests were seen as demonstrating
the law's impermissible effect of "'dampening' and 'diluting' and otherwise moisturizing the
party's message." Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, Group Dynamics, Dissent and Intrigue: A Look at
the Supreme Court, 1999-2000, 60 OR. ST. B. BULL. 15, 16 (Aug./Sept. 2000).
173. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000). The Court also noted that it
had previously, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557 (1995), rejected this sort of "interest" as not admissible. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at
582. This is a type of ideologically non-neutral interest that is not admissible to challenge the
right of association. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 259,
272 (2000).
174. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 583.
175. Id. California believed these people were disenfranchised "because under a closed
primary they are unable to participate in what amounts to the determinative election-the majority
party's primary; the only way to ensure that they have an 'effective' vote is to force the party to
open its primary to them." Id.
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countervailing and legitimate right of the party to determine its own
membership qualifications."'176 Accordingly, the Court did not believe that
Proposition 198 was needed "to solve the problem"; a voter merely had to
join the party to be able to cast his or her vote. 177
As for the four remaining interests asserted by California, the Court
found that these were not compelling in the circumstances of the case. 178
These asserted interests-"promoting fairness, affording voters greater
choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy"-were not
immediately discarded by the Court, but after consideration, the Court
found that the aspects of these interests addressed by Proposition 198 were
not "highly significant."1 79 California argued that the blanket primary
would promote fairness in that in a non-blanket primary, nonparty members
in "safe" districts would not have a chance of determining the party
candidate.180 However, the Court found that this would not be more unfair
than allowing nonparty members to "hijack" the party.181
Furthermore, according to the Court, the blanket primary would not
afford a voter greater choice, as asserted by California. 182 On the contrary,
there would be less choice for the voters because all candidates would have
more "centrist" views.183 This possible broadening of the range of choices
favored by the majority perhaps would not even be a legitimate state
interest, let alone a compelling one. 1 84
The same reasoning, and the same defects, applied to the alleged
interest of increasing voter participation.185 According to the Court, this
interest was merely another way to say that California could manipulate
primary elections to ensure that political parties nominate general election
candidates more to the liking of the voting majority, thereby increasing
voter turnout. 186
176. Id. (quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 215-16 & n.6 (1986)
and Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), summarily affd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976)).
177. Id. at 584. The Court noted that this might be a hard choice but that having to become a
member of a party was not a restriction imposed by the state on the voter's freedom of association.
Id. However, if party members have to accept the nonaffiliated voter's selection of the party's
candidate, it would be a "state-imposed restriction upon [their freedom of association]." Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. A "safe district" is a district in which one party is dominant. Cal. Democratic Party
v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 661 (9th Cir. 1999).




185. Id. at 584-85.
186. Id. at 585.
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Lastly, California's interest in protecting the confidentiality of a
person's party affiliation could not be considered a compelling one. 187 If it
were compelling, federal statutes would have to stop requiring a declaration
of party affiliation as a condition for being appointed to certain offices. 188
Finally, Proposition 198 was not a narrowly tailored means of fur-
thering these interests, even if they were compelling. 8 9 In the Court's
opinion, these interests asserted by California could all be protected by a
state's use of a nonpartisan blanket primary. 90 The state would determine
the qualifications it would require of a candidate before he or she is put on
the ballot.191 Voters would then be able to vote for any candidate and the
winner (or winners) would proceed to the general election.192 According to
the Court, a nonpartisan blanket primary would allow California to "ensure
more choice, greater participation, increased 'privacy,' and a sense of
'fairness"' without infringing on a party's First Amendment right of
association. 193  At the same time, such a system has most of the
characteristics of the partisan blanket primary.194 It would, however,
eliminate the element of the voters determining a party's candidate. 195
The Court concluded that the legitimate interests of California and the
First Amendment rights of the Parties were not "inherently incom-
patible."1 96 However, they were incompatible in this case due to California
"forcing political parties to associate with those who do not share their
beliefs."197 The Court therefore found that the burden Proposition 198
imposed on the parties' constitutional right of political association was both
severe and unnecessary. 19 8
187. Id. In the Court's view, it would most likely be possible to have a closed primary
election in which a voter's party affiliation would not have to be divulged to the public; but even




190. Id. This is the type of primary previously utilized by Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. §
18:521 (1979 & Supp. 2001); see also Allison, supra note 25, at 111-14, for criticism of this part
of the Court's opinion.
191. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 585 (2000).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 586.
194. Id. at 585.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 586.
198. Id.
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B. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, stated his belief that "[e]ncourag-
ing citizens to vote is a legitimate, indeed essential, state objective." 199
However, he asserted that the real purpose behind Proposition 198 was "to
force a political party to accept a candidate it may not want and, by so
doing, to change the party's doctrinal position on major issues."200 Since
Proposition 198 therefore was subject to "careful scrutiny," he agreed with
the opinion of the majority. 201
However, Justice Kennedy had an additional concern regarding Propo-
sition 198.202 He reasoned that Proposition 198 might not withstand
scrutiny because "of the Court's denial of First Amendment protection to a
political party's spending of its own funds and resources in cooperation
with its preferred candidate .... the Federal Government or the State has the
power to prevent the party from using the very remedy California now
offers up to defend its law."203 California had defended the blanket primary
by asserting that a party was free to endorse and spend money on the
candidates it favored, thereby "defending its doctrinal positions by advising
the voters of its own preference." 204
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
Justice Stevens started his dissent by proclaiming that the Court must
respect the policy choice made by the voters of California when they
adopted Proposition 198, based on principles of federalism.25 In Justice
Stevens' view, the majority blurred the distinction between a private
199. Id. at 587 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy went as far as to say that it might
be a close call if Proposition 198 was simply a way to make elections more fair and open or
addressed matters purely of party structure. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. As to the standard of review to be used, Justice Kennedy simply noted that "[w]hen
the State seeks to direct changes in a political party's philosophy by forcing upon it unwanted
candidates and wresting the choice between moderation and partisanship away from the party
itself, the State's incursion on the party's associational freedom is subject to careful scrutiny under
the First Amendment." id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 588 (citing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)). "[T]he Court had recently suggested that states could constrict or
eliminate parties' ability to engage in coordinated spending and thereby to defend themselves
against the states' 'doctrinal intervention' through blanket primaries." The Supreme Court 1999
Term Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 273-74 (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S.
567, 589 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
204. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 588.
205. Id. at 591 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was partially joined in his dissent by
Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 590. Justice Ginsburg did not join in Part H of Justice Stevens' dissent,
which discusses Proposition 198's validity under the Election Clause. Id. at 590, 602.
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organization's right to define itself and its messages and the right of a state
to define the obligations of citizens and organizations performing public
functions.206
Justice Stevens' fundamental disagreement with the Court seemed to
be that he considered primary elections to be public affairs.207 He noted
that the court of appeals correctly observed that political parties are not
wholly private associations, and if they were, their associational rights
would be more absolute and comprehensive. 208 According to Justice
Stevens, however, the right not to associate that the majority relied on was
"simply inapplicable" to participation in state elections, since primary
elections, unlike most party affairs, are in fact state action. 209 Justice
Stevens here argued that since primary elections are not private affairs, the
majority misconstrued the First Amendment by limiting a state's power to
broaden voter participation in the electoral process. 210
Justice Stevens also questioned whether the remaining open primaries
used by many states would withstand scrutiny under the majority's
reasoning. 2 11 "This Court's willingness to invalidate the primary schemes
of 3 States and cast serious constitutional doubt on the schemes of 29 others
at the parties' behest is," Justice Stevens continued, "an extraordinary
intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States." 2 12 In
his view, "the First Amendment does not mandate that a putatively private
association be granted the power to dictate the organizational structure of
state-run, state-financed primary elections." 21 3 Finally, Justice Stevens
concluded by suggesting that Proposition 198 might be questionable under
206. Id. at 591-92.
207. Id. at 595. Justice Stevens disagreed with the Court's reading of Terry and Allwright.
Id. at 594 & n.5. The majority did not find that previous case law held "that party affairs are
[wholly] public affairs, free of First Amendment protections," and on this point, Justice Stevens
agreed; however, he also asserted that the case law stood for the proposition that primary elections
are indeed state action. Id. at 573, 594-96.
208. Id. at 593 (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1999)).
209. Id. at 593-96.
210. ld. at 594-95. Justice Stevens here averred that the efforts of the states to broaden voter
participation in state-run elections should be virtually free from judicial scrutiny. Id. However,
state rules that diminish voter participation are subject to strict scrutiny. Id.
211. Id. at 597.
212. Id. at 598. Justice Stevens relied on figures from the Ninth Circuit's opinion, according
to which fifteen states have closed primaries, eight have semi-closed, twenty-one have open
primaries, and four have blanket primaries. Id. (citing Cal. Democratic Party, 169 F.3d at 650).
The Ninth Circuit based these findings on, among other things, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Tashjian, which is from 1986. Cal. Democratic Party, 169 F.3d at 650-51.
213. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 598 (2000).
2001]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the Elections Clause, at least as applied to congressional elections, since it
had been adopted by initiative rather than by the state legislature. 2t4
IV. IMPACT
The Court noted that the blanket primary is "qualitatively different"
from the closed primary because in a closed primary a person adverse to the
party must at least register with the party to become a member and is also
limited to voting for candidates of that party. 215 This statement indicates
that the closed primary systems would not be found unconstitutional under
the Court's ruling in California Democratic Party.2 16
Regarding open primaries, the Court suggested that these "may" be
constitutionally different from the blanket primaries since a voter is limited
to one party's ballot in the open primary.2 17 Voting for only one party can
be seen as an act of affiliation with that party, making it different from the
blanket primary.2 18 However, the Court expressly stated that it was not
required to determine the constitutionality of open primaries in the case
before it.219 Nonetheless, Justice Stevens asserted that there is a danger that
open primaries will also be struck down with the reasoning the Court used
because open primaries, in his view, are supported by many of the same
state interests as those asserted by California in California Democratic
Party.2 20 It has also been suggested that because the Court strongly
emphasized how important it is for parties' identities to select candidates
who share party views and will fight for those views, states may not be
allowed to require parties to participate in open primaries. 221 States may
not even be allowed to require parties to select their candidates through
214. Id. at 602. This is the part Justice Ginsburg did not join. Id. at 590. Justice Stevens
reasoned that it would be proper for the California Legislature to adopt a blanket primary system
under the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof." Id. at 602 (quoting CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1) (emphasis
added). However, Justice Stevens found it unclear whether a state election system adopted by
popular initiative, not by the legislature, is constitutional when applied to the election of United
States Senators and Representatives. Id. Under the California Constitution, a statute adopted by
popular initiative cannot be amended or repealed by the California Legislature, without the
consent of the voters. Id. The text of the Election Clause implies, according to Justice Stevens,
that this is unconstitutional since there is no review by the legislature. Id.
215. Id. at 576.
216. See id. (distinguishing closed primaries from blanket primaries).
217. Id. at 577 & n.8 (citing Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel.
LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 130 & n.2 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
218. Id. (quoting LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 130 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 597. Justice Stevens also reasoned that Proposition 198 may be invalid as it
pertains to elections of United States Senators and Representatives. Id. at 602.
221. Allison, supra note 25, at 116.
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primary elections at all. 222 Others, however, believe that states can still use
open primaries. 223
After the decision in California Democratic Party, Arizona's attorney
general issued an opinion stating that Arizona's open primary law was
constitutional in light of the Supreme Court's holding.224 The opinion
noted that the open primary law in effect in Arizona did not burden political
parties to the extent that Proposition 198 did.225 The attorney general
emphasized that the purpose behind the Arizona law was to allow voting by
some registered voters who were excluded from the closed primary.226
Because it applied only to independents and others who were not able to
vote in a closed primary, there was less risk of a party's candidate being
selected by party opponents. 227 Members of a party were also limited to
voting the ballot of that party. 228 Concluding that the burdens imposed by
Arizona's law on the rights of political parties were not severe, the law was
subject to the less stringent standard applied in Timmons.229  Since
Arizona's open primary law promoted voter participation, promoted
fairness, and ensured that all registered voters had an opportunity to vote,
the burden placed on political parties in Arizona was justified. 230
While it may seem clear that other state statutes providing for a blanket
primary system would be struck down under the Court's ruling in
California Democratic Party,231 the Court's opinion suggests that the
nonpartisan version of the blanket primary used in Louisiana would not
violate a party's associational rights as protected by the First
Amendment.2 32 Before this ruling, two other states, besides California, had
a partisan blanket primary system. 233
222. Id.
223. The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 278.





229. Id. According to the attorney general, "important regulatory interests" justify
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions pursuant to Timmons. Id. (quoting Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)).
230. Id.
231. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000) (striking down California's
blanket primary as placing a severe and unnecessary burden on the right of political association).
232. Id. The argument that the type of nonpartisan blanket primary used in Louisiana would
not violate a party's associational rights has been criticized as being "ludicrous." Allison, supra
note 25, at 113. According to Professor Allison, recent Louisiana elections show that its blanket
primary likely injures both the interest of the parties and the state. Id. at 112. Others, however,
are of the opinion that states can use nonpartisan blanket primaries. The Supreme Court 1999
Term Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 278.
233. ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.060 (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.18.200 (1993).
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As a direct result of the Court's ruling, the Supreme Court of Alaska
found Alaska's blanket primary statute "clearly unconstitutional." 234 In
O'Callaghan v. State (O'Callaghan 1/),235 the Supreme Court of Alaska
noted that it could not find any "constitutionally significant differences"
between the primary election statute in effect in Alaska and California's
statute that was declared unconstitutional in California Democratic
Party.236 Declaring that it was bound to adhere to the decisions of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, the court overruled the
previously decided O'Callaghan I and declared Alaska's blanket primary
system unconstitutional. 237 However, in March of 2002, a federal judge in
Washington upheld Washington's blanket primary system as constitutional,
distinguishing it from the primary system found unconstitutional in
California Democratic Party.238 Political parties in Washington plan to
appeal the ruling.239
California Democratic Party has also been cited by several other cases,
essentially for the propositions that the freedom of association includes a
right not to associate,240 that a party "has an important constitutional
interest in selecting candidates who represent it in a general election," 24'
that the states have authority "to structure and monitor primary
elections," 242 and for the standard of review to be used when there is a
burden on political speech and association.243
North Dakota uses an open primary in which a voter can only vote in
one party's primary election, but he or she does not have to be a registered
member of that party. 244 It is not clear at this point what the impact will be
on open primaries as a result of the Supreme Court's ruling in California
234. O'Callaghan v. State (O'Callaghan 11), 6 P.3d 728, 730 (Alaska 2000).
235. 6 P.3d 728 (Alaska 2000).
236. O'Callaghan H, 6 P.3d at 730.
237. Id. The court also noted that the partially closed primary system, adopted by the
Department of Elections, did not in itself violate the First Amendment. Id. at 731.
238. Neil Modie & Angela Galloway, "Blanket" Primary is Ruled Legal; Political Parties
Expect to Appeal Judgment That Upholds Present System, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, March
28, 2002, at Al.
239. Id.
240. Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2000); Hole v. N.C. Bd. of Elections,
112 F. Supp. 2d 475,480 (M.D. N.C. 2000).
241. Marion County Comm. of the Ind. Democratic Party v. Marion County Election Bd.,
2000 WL 1206740, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 2000).
242. Krislov, 226 F.3d at 859; Gelb v. Bd. of Elections, 224 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
243. Lerman v. Bd. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 149 (2d Cir. 2000).
244. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-11-22 (1997 & Supp. 2001). Registration is not required at all
for voting in North Dakota. Id. § 16.1-01-04 (1997) (setting forth voter qualifications).
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Democratic Party.245 Since it appears that open primaries possibly may not
withstand a constitutional challenge, North Dakota may have to change its
primary election system.246 However, this question will most likely remain




In California Democratic Party, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
strict scrutiny standard of review for a state law infringing on a political
party's First Amendment freedom of association. 248 Using such a strict
standard, California's Proposition 198 was clearly struck down.249
The decision leaves some uncertainty however as to the future of the
other types of primary election systems. 250 While it appears that closed
primaries would survive constitutional scrutiny, the future of the open
primaries is uncertain and will likely remain so until the Supreme Court
reviews that type of primary election system.251
Sara Stenberg-Miller
245. See Allison, supra note 25, at 115-16 (stating that the broadness of the Cal. Democratic
Party precedent is unclear).
246. See id. at 116 (discussing the impact of Cal. Democratic Party on open primary
elections).
247. See id. (proposing that the Court's assertion that open primaries are distinguishable, and
therefore constitutional, from blanket primaries will have to be ratified in a later case).
248. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 582 (2000) (setting forth the standard of
review to be used); see also The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 275
(noting the difference in standard of review depending on whether the restriction is viewpoint-
neutral or ideologically motivated).
249. Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 586.
250. See, e.g., Allison, supra note 25, at 115-116 (noting that it is possible that states might
be forbidden "from requiring parties to participate in open primaries"); see also The Supreme
Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, supra note 173, at 278 (reasoning that open primaries are
constitutional).
251. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 576 (noting that blanket primaries "may" be
constitutionally different from open primaries).
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